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1 Crises and the Transformation of theNational
Political Space in Europe
Hanspeter Kriesi and Swen Hutter
1.1 Introduction
In European Party Politics in Times of Crisis we shall study the trans-
formation of national party competition in the shadow of the great
economic crisis that Europe underwent in the aftermath of the fall of
Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008. We take this event as the
beginning of the Great Recession, which, after having ﬁrst hit the
United States, quickly spread to Europe. As is well known, almost all
the European economies contracted in the ﬁrst storm of the ﬁnancial
crisis. Most countries recovered fairly quickly after this ﬁrst ‘shock’,
but especially those in southern Europe have been caught in a spiral
of stagnation, high unemployment (especially among young people)
and public debt ever since. Moreover, the ﬁnancial crisis soon devel-
oped into the so-called euro crisis. The governments of the weaker
economies were unable to cope with the economic crisis, and the
structural weaknesses of the European Monetary Union (EMU) were
revealed. Ultimately, the countries that needed ﬁnancial assistance
had to accept tough conditions imposed by their international cred-
itors. Most importantly, they had to adopt austerity policies, with
harsh consequences for large parts of society and with important
implications for the structuring of their party systems.
Our key question in this book is how the multiple crises that Europe
faced in the aftermath of the Great Recession inﬂuenced the intensity and
structuration of political conﬂict in national party systems. In particular,
we ask how the cultural integration–demarcation divide that had been
shaping up in north-western Europe before the onset of the Great
Recession was affected by these multiple crises and whether this divide
was ‘travelling’ to the European south and east.
To answer these questions, European Party Politics in Times of Crisis
covers party competition in the national electoral arenas of ﬁfteen
European countries, with seven cases from north-western Europe
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(Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and
Switzerland) and four each from southern Europe (Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain) and central-eastern Europe (Hungary, Latvia,
Poland and Romania). The study focuses on the years from the early
2000s to 2016, i.e. a period in which Europe faced multiple economic,
political and cultural challenges. In several countries, the economic crisis
was linked to an (emerging or existing) political crisis. When the eco-
nomic crisis combined with a political crisis, its impact on the structura-
tion of the country’s party system seemsmost pronounced.Moreover, the
last years of the period covered by this study were characterised by the so-
called refugee crisis, precipitated by a massive inﬂow of asylum seekers
(especially from war-ridden Syria). These crises did not affect all the
countries in the same way. Instead, we observe pronounced differences
across and within the European regions. Accounting for the different
ways in which the crises were articulated politically not only constitutes
a challenging puzzle for comparative political science but is also of utmost
social and political relevance.
In our endeavour to come to terms with the political fallout from
these crises, we rely on a dynamic concept of cleavage formation (see
Bornschier 2010; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). As in previous work, our
structural approach starts from the idea that political parties are
constrained to operate within a given competitive space. From the
perspective of this approach, new issues and changes in the dimen-
sions of party competition emerge exogenously, i.e. from social con-
ﬂicts which are products of long-term social change. Following the
Rokkanean tradition, we link the structure of party competition in
Europe to long-term trends in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967a;
Rokkan 1999). Thus, it is crucial to our understanding of the chan-
ging national party systems that the potential impacts of the multiple
crises on European politics were embedded in processes of change
that had been going on long before the onset of the Great Recession
(see also Hooghe and Marks 2018). The decisive question then is
that of the extent to which the different crises might have led to new
divisions in societies or instead reinforced tensions that had already
been politically articulated and mobilised in the past. At the same
time, our approach to party competition considers the dynamics of
political conﬂict and the agency of political actors in structuring new
divides. To keep a cleavage alive or to reinforce the relevance of
a new social divide, the core issues linked to it need to give rise to
publicly visible conﬂicts. At this point, the more strategic approaches
to party competition have much to offer as they focus on the strate-
gies used by political parties to expand the scope of conﬂict, as
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Schattschneider (1975 [1960]) aptly put it.1 Most important in this
context are strategies of position-taking and issue emphasis (see, e.g.,
Hobolt and de Vries 2015). From such a perspective, it is crucial to
ask which type of political party might be most likely to exploit the
mobilisation potentials induced by the crises and with what kind of
strategy.
Figure 1.1 presents the theoretical framework which guides our analy-
sis of the consequences of the Great Recession on the structuration of
party competition in Europe. As the ﬁgure indicates, the transformation
of national party systems is ultimately driven by long-term processes of
structural societal change. These processes relate above all to changing
social conﬂict structures and the degree of their institutionalisation in
national party systems in the period before the crisis hit the continent.
In addition, the transformation of party systems is constrained by national
regime legacies and also by the emerging multi-level political system of
the European Union. At any given moment in time, including the
moment when the Great Recession took off in autumn 2008, the struc-
turation of party competition is decisively shaped by these long-term
processes of structural change.
An economic crisis like the Great Recession may serve as a catalyst to
the transformation of the existing conﬁguration of a party system.
The impact of the crisis is likely to depend on its severity and its timing
in relation to ongoing processes of change. In the short run, economic
crises lead to punishment of incumbents. This is a well-known tenet of
the economic voting literature. In a deep economic crisis such as the
Great Recession, voters’ disenchantment with mainstream parties and
their embrace of challenger parties may, however, go beyond the nar-
row conﬁnes of economic voting. The economic crisis may undermine
the legitimacy of all mainstream parties and even of the democratic
system as it has been operating in a given country (i.e. the economic
crisis may give rise to a political crisis, which may be at the origin of
a profound transformation of the national party system). However, in
our framework, the impact of a crisis situation on a transformation of
party competition not only depends on its previous structure and the
type and extent of the crisis but also on more contingent political
conditions at the moment when the crisis hits. Most importantly, we
also take into account the composition of the incumbents at the time of
the crisis and the strategies employed by the main protagonists in the
ongoing political struggles.
1 On the difference between structural and strategic approaches, see de Vries and Marks
(2012).
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In this introductory chapter, we discuss each element of our frame-
work. We start with the long-term trends (Section 1.2) and the structura-
tion of party competition before the Great Recession (Section 1.3). Next,
we focus on the questions of why and under what conditions crises might
act as triggers for the transformation of party competition (Section 1.4),
before drawing out more speciﬁc implications for the resulting patterns of
change (Section 1.5). Importantly, we stress that the long-term processes
of change and the crisis experiences varied considerably between three
macro-regions of Europe – north-western Europe (NWE), southern
Europe (SE), and central and eastern Europe (CEE). While we shall
present the developments in ﬁfteen individual countries, we believe that
as a ﬁrst step it makes sense to reduce the complexity by insisting on the
major differences that exist between these three macro-regions.
Therefore, what we present in this introductory chapter are stylised
accounts of differences among the three regions which are then used as
reference points in the detailed empirical country chapters that constitute
the core of this volume.
1.2 Embedding the Economic Crisis in a Long-Term
Perspective
As outlined, we ﬁrst introduce the three long-term structural factors that
we consider to have had a decisive inﬂuence on the structuration of party
competition in the long run. As shown in Figure 1.1, these are long-term
processes of societal change, regime legacies and the ever-more-
important multi-level system of European governance.
For the conceptualisation of long-term processes of societal change, we
refer back to Rokkan’s seminal approach, according to which European
countries have been profoundly shaped by a series of social and political
‘revolutions’. These revolutions resulted in a limited set of clearly identi-
ﬁable deep-seated conﬂicts (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1999).
The two key conﬂicts have been those of religion and class, with
a centre–periphery or regional conﬂict taking on some importance in
some countries too. These conﬂicts have been described in terms of
‘cleavages’ because they can be reduced neither to social divides (‘social
cleavages’) nor to purely political struggles (‘political cleavages’).
We agree with Bartolini (2005) that the concept of ‘cleavages’ when
properly understood does not come with adjectives attached. A fully
developed cleavage includes an empirical, a normative and an institu-
tional element – that is, a distinct social-structural basis, speciﬁc values
and beliefs (a political consciousness), and their political organisation and
mobilisation (Bartolini and Mair 1990).
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In our earlier work, we argued that the deep-seated two-dimensional
structure of the north-western European party systems deﬁned by reli-
gious and class conﬂicts has been decisively modiﬁed since the 1970s by
two fundamental societal transformations, which created structural
potentials that were then mobilised by political parties (Kriesi et al.
2008, 2012). On one hand, we refer here to the growing impact of
conﬂicts linked to the ‘silent revolution’ of cultural change in west
European societies (Inglehart 1977), which was in turn an expression of
processes of deindustrialisation, the expansion of tertiary education, fem-
inisation of the workforce and occupational upgrading. On the other
hand, we refer to processes of globalisation or ‘denationalisation’ (Zürn
1998), understood as the opening-up of economic, cultural and political
national borders, which started to accelerate from the late 1980s.
Both transformations fundamentally reshaped European societies.
According to our argument, the ‘silent revolution’ drove a wedge into
the new middle class, opposing socio-cultural professionals to techno-
crats and mangers (see, e.g., Kriesi 1989). By contrast, increasing inter-
national economic competition, an increasing inﬂux of migrants from
ever more distant and culturally more different shores, and increasing
political integration in the European Union created conﬂicts between
what we call the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from globalisation (see, e.g.,
Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). The ‘losers’ from globalisation are people
whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries.
They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat to their social
status and their social security. They are a heterogeneous group, because
they may be losing in economic terms (as a result of increasing interna-
tional economic competition, delocalisation and foreign worker immigra-
tion), in cultural terms (because they are not prepared to cope with
a multicultural society) or in political terms (as a result of supranational
integration). The ‘winners’, on the other hand, include people who
beneﬁt from the new opportunities resulting from globalisation and
whose life chances are enhanced. The essential criterion for determining
the impact of the opening up of national boundaries on individual life
chances is whether or not someone possesses exit options. As we will
discuss, these conﬂicts have been shaping the party systems in NWE,
while their impact on the those in SE and CEE is much more uncertain.
Apart from social change, in our framework we emphasise the effects of
regime legacies on the structuration of party competition.While countries
in NWE have been democracies at least since World War II, with the
exception of Italy the larger countries in SE only emerged from their
authoritarian past in the second half of the 1970s, and the transition to
democracy of theCEE countries only dates from the early 1990s. This has
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signiﬁcant implications for the institutionalisation of the party systems in
the respective countries. As is well known, such institutionalisation takes
time. In his ‘Reﬂections on the revolution in Europe’, Dahrendorf (1990:
79–93) distinguishes between three speeds of the political transition to
democracy: the hour of the lawyer; the hour of the politicians; and
the hour of the citizens. He suggests that the hour of the lawyer, i.e. the
formal process of constitutional reform, takes at least six months. After
the establishment of a constitution, normal politics takes over and sets in
motion political and economic reforms. This is the hour of the politicians,
which takes at least six years before a general sense that things are moving
ahead is likely to spread. The third speed refers to the citizens, i.e. to ‘the
social foundations which transform the constitution and the economy
from fair-weather into all-weather institutions which can withstand the
storms generated within and without, and sixty years are barely enough to
lay these foundations’ (p. 93). It is the hour of the citizens which is most
important from the point of view of the structuration of party systems: as
a result of their belated democratisation, the party systems of SE andCEE
were less institutionalised than the party systems of NWEwhen the Great
Recession struck.
These party systems were less rooted in the social structure and, as
a result, more easily transformed under the impact of the economic
crisis. For the CEE countries in particular, Mair (1997: 192) notes as
their most striking feature their ‘lack of systemness’, in the sense of
‘patterned interactions’ between parties. In his assessment (p. 192),
a ‘combination of a weak cleavage structure, an uncertain and volatile
institutional environment, and a very open and unpredictable structure
of competition’ constrained the consolidation of the party systems in
this part of Europe. In SE, too, the newly emerging systems were
organisationally somewhat weak and much less rooted in the social
structure than their NWE counterparts, even if these countries rapidly
developed stable party systems when they emerged from their author-
itarian regimes (Gunther 2005). Except for the Communist parties and
the Spanish Socialists (PSOE), party builders in SE were unconstrained
by institutional models and were free to create modern electoralist
parties, mainly of the catch-all and the personalistic types. To be
sure, in Italy a strong party system was established as it returned to
democracy after World War II. The parties even became the linchpin of
Italian politics (‘partitocrazia’). However, the Italian party system was
swept away in the early 1990s under the joint impact of deep political
and economic crises. The new system that replaced the old one in 1994
proved to be as weakly rooted in the social structure as the party
systems in the other three countries, and just as dominated by
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electoralist parties of the catch-all and personalistic types (see, e.g.,
Bartolini et al. 2004; Newell 2006; Pasquino 2007).
At the same time, the legacies of the previous non-democratic regimes
continue to contribute to the structuring of party competition in SE and
CEE. In CEE, the legacy of communism served to discredit the post-
communist left and the radical left in general. Thus, the ﬁrst free elections
were ‘largely a referendum on the discredited communist regime’
(Grzymala-Busse 2002: 180). The communist parties were trounced
and appeared to be spent forces. Nonetheless, some successor parties
successfully broke with the past and made a comeback in later elections.
The successful strategy of regeneration of the left entailed avoiding
appeals to nostalgia and socialist ideology. As Tavits and Letki (2009:
556) argue, not only the former communists but also theNewLeft ‘had to
stay away from strong socialist policy positions to avoid being associated
with the former regime’. In SE, in turn, the parties on the right faced an
equivalent problem because of the legacy of previous authoritarian and/or
fascist regimes. Only in Italy did the fascist right survive the fall of the
regime and remain able to organise itself openly. But, paradoxically, the
Italian neo-fascists started to decline at the very moment when the radical
right began its rise in NWE, precisely because of their solid neo-fascist
lineage (Ignazi 2003: 52). Only by distancing themselves from this legacy
could they make a fresh start.
Finally, we need to keep in mind that, apart from Switzerland, all
the countries included in our study were members of the European
Union during the period covered. The embedding of national party
competition in the multi-level structure of the EU polity has implica-
tions for the structuring of national party systems. First, national
politics have become increasingly constrained by supranational deci-
sion-making. This became particularly apparent in the political crisis
management of the euro crisis. With the shift of decision-making
competences to the EU level, the European integration process,
which is part and parcel of the new conﬂict linked to the opening up
of national borders, has become more critical for party competition
and political representation at the national level.
Second, it is important to keep in mind that there are two channels of
representation of national interests at the European level – a channel each
for the representation of nation states (in the European Council and the
Council) and for that of citizens (in the European Parliament), and that
the EU has consistently privileged the representation of nation states over
the representation of individual citizens (Schimmelfennig 2010: 220).
This implies that in the EU the partisan channel is underdeveloped
compared to the intergovernmental channel. The representation of
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nation states prevails, which means that national executives together with
supranational executive actors dominate the policy-making process and
the public debate at the European level. Again, this became most visible
during the management of the euro crisis. The prevalence of the inter-
governmental channel at the European level does, however, not necessa-
rily imply that the EU polity has been constructed as ‘a protected sphere,
safe from the demands of voters and their representatives’, asMair (2013:
100–109) claims. However, it implies that the partisan representation is
still essentially conﬁned to the national arena and that the politicisation of
European integration takes place at the level of national politics.
Third, the relevance of the multi-level structure of the EU polity to
national politics is likely to vary not only betweenmember states and non-
member states of the EU but also among member states. During the
Great Recession, it was arguably more important for eurozone members
and, among the latter, for the debtor states which became the object of
supranational crisis management.
1.3 TheStructuration of PartyCompetition at theOnset of the
Great Recession
We now turn to the impact of the three long-term structural transforma-
tions on the structuration of national party competition. From our per-
spective, party competition is above all programmatic or issue-based (i.e.
parties compete with each other by positioning themselves on various
political issues and by manipulating the salience of these issues).2
We focus on the political actors who have mobilised the structural poten-
tials created by long-term societal change and on the issues that have
come to deﬁne the conﬂicts articulated by these actors.
As Hooghe and Marks (2018: 112) argue, in various ways established
parties are constrained in their positioning on major conﬂict dimensions,
which implies that the source of dynamism in party systems in response to
major shifts in voter preferences (i.e. in response to long-term societal
change) comes from new political parties. Most importantly, we would
argue, established parties are constrained by the distinct programmatic
reputations which they have acquired as a result of their mobilisation of
past structural conﬂicts.3 While new political parties have a signiﬁcant
advantage in mobilising conﬂicts arising from societal change, their rise is
2 Admittedly, this is a restricted view of party competition, as parties may also compete in
clientelistic or personalistic terms.
3 This is the sense of ‘issue ownership’: the parties have what Petrocik (1996) describes as
a history of attention, initiative and innovation towards speciﬁc issues, which leads voters
to attribute them greater credibility on these issues. As Scammel (1999: 729) observes:
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conditioned by processes of dealignment (i.e. processes linked to the
decline of the traditional cleavages of religion and class), by the institu-
tional context (above all the electoral system) and by the strategies of the
established parties (dismissive, adversarial or accommodating) (seeKriesi
2008). We shall not, however, enter into the details of the rise of new
challengers in speciﬁc national contexts but instead will present a rough
outline of the pattern of party competition at the onset of the Great
Recession in the various regions. We start with NWE, where the process
of structural change has advanced most and where its articulation in the
party system has (with the notable exception of Germany) been least
impeded by regime legacies.
In NWE, in the aftermath of the ‘glorious’ postwar period, which came
to an end in the ‘stagﬂation’ of the 1970s, two waves of political mobilisa-
tions articulated the new types of social conﬂicts that were to become
crucial for the structuration of the west European party systems. The ﬁrst
wave (the wave of the New Left) was an expression of structural trans-
formations that were endogenous to the European nation-states – the
‘silent revolution’, which was driven by the socio-cultural segment of the
new middle class that articulated its demands in the so-called new social
movements. This revolution gave rise to the ‘new politics’, which have
mainly transformed the left (see, e.g., Müller-Rommel 1989a): the new
social movements stood at the origin of the rise of theGreen parties and of
the transformation of the west European social-democratic parties, which
during the process becamemiddle-class parties in almost all the countries
of western Europe (see, e.g., Gingrich and Häusermann 2015;
Häusermann 2015; Kitschelt 1994).
The second wave (the wave of the New Right) started in the early
eighties with the rise of the Front National (FN) in France and continues
to the present day. This second wave relates to social conﬂicts arising
from ‘globalisation’. As we have argued, the heterogeneous set of ‘losers
from globalisation’ have been most successfully mobilised by the radical
populist right (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012). In this process, these
parties of the populist radical right, which we label with the broader
term ‘New Right’,4 have become the party of the working class in many
west European countries (Oesch 2008, 2013; Afonso and Rennwald
2015). Some of these parties have been newly emerged (such as the FN,
‘Reputation, based on record and credible promises, is the only thing of substance that
a party can promote to potential voters.’
4 We use the term ‘New Right’ to refer to the populist radical right (PPR) party family and
some transformed conservative-right parties (in particular, in central and eastern Europe)
which do not so easily fall under the PPR label but play a functionally equivalent role in
their respective party systems (see, e.g., Hanley 2008).
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VB, PVV, LN, FP, DF and SD), while others (such as the FPÖ, the SVP
and the True Finns) are transformed (liberal-)conservative mainstream
parties.
What the two waves of mobilisation have in common is that they were
concerned above all with cultural issues. They primarily transformed the
meaning of the cultural dimension of the party space, which, in the
European context, had traditionally been dominated by issues related to
religion. Interpreting the impact of the New Left, Kitschelt (1994, 1995)
re-baptised the cultural dimension as the ‘libertarian-authoritarian’
dimension; Hooghe et al. (2002) called it the GAL-TAN dimension;
focusing on the impact of the New Right, we choose to relabel it the
‘demarcation-integration’ dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008).
Theorising the joint impact of both waves, Bornschier (2010a, 2010b,
2015) suggests that the reshaped cultural dimension refers to
a fundamental conﬂict between universalistic and traditionalist commu-
nitarian values (traditionalism invokes the rejection of universalism, while
communitarianism makes reference to the populist right’s conception of
community). As he argues, the crystallisation of this conﬂict remained
partial as long as the New Right did not provide the counter-position of
the New Left with a broader and more permanent basis.
Moreover, it is important to note that the cumulative effect of the two
waves of mobilisation has been a continual erosion of mainstream parties.
To the extent that they were not responsive to the new fundamental
conﬂict, they increasingly lost voters to the challenger parties that mobi-
lised the voters who felt neglected by them (Mair 2013; Kriesi 2014b;
Hobolt and Tilley 2016). Alternatively, the shift in party competition to
the cultural dimension and the erosion of the mainstream parties have
been explained by their convergence along the economic dimension,
which is a result of the decline of the traditional class cleavage and the
increasingly restricted options in macro-economic (but not in social)
policy-making (Kitschelt 2007). Along the economic dimension, the
moderate left has been moving to the right, while the moderate right has
been moving to the left (see, e.g., Morgan 2015). However, what these
arguments overlook is that in spite of the decrease in the polarisation of
the main protagonists along the economic dimension, economic issues
have remained salient for party competition. As the mainstream parties’
positions on economic issues converge and these issues become ‘valence
issues’, parties are still seeking to differentiate themselves in terms of
competence (i.e. the means proposed to achieve the shared goals)
(Stokes 1963, 1992). For valence issues, performance and a reputation
for being a credible and competent defender of the common goal, i.e.
issue ownership, become decisive for a party’s success. As issue
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ownership has proven to be more ﬂuid and contested than initially
assumed (Bélanger and Meguid 2008), competition on valence issues
may remain intense. Parties may lose their reputations for competence to
their main competitors as a result of exogenous shocks (e.g. the British
Conservatives in the 1992 ERM crisis [Clarke et al. 2004]) or they may
successfully ‘trespass’ (Sides 2006) on the opposing camp’s preferred
territory (see, e.g., Arndt 2013).
For our argument, it is crucial that the structural transformations and
the double wave of political mobilisation they gave rise to were much
weaker in the other two regions of Europe. In SE, Greece, Portugal and
Spain remained under authoritarian regimes until the mid-1970s.
Accordingly, the mobilisation by new social movements .was compara-
tively weak or non-existent in SE,5 and there was no signiﬁcant New Left
at the time (see, e.g., Kitschelt 1988). As the new systems emerged, the
moderate Social-democratic parties came to be the main force on the left,
while the Communists – who had originally dominated the split left in
SE – declined in all four countries. The continued presence of the
Communists and the heavy legacy of the deep rift between Communists
and Socialists implied, however, that the New Left, to the extent that it
did develop at all, remained in the shadow of the ‘old left’. Accordingly,
Green parties have been weak in SE and the socialists have assumed fewer
of the characteristics of the New Left than they have in NWE. In a way,
the mainstream parties of the left have belatedly taken up many of the
concerns raised by the New Left in NWE. This is exempliﬁed by more
recent struggles over abortion or gay rights in the 2000s (for the Spanish
case, see Encarnación 2009).
The second transformation did not have the impact on SE party sys-
tems that it had in NWE either. On the right, the party systems that
emerged after the rupture in SE were dominated by a moderate centre-
right party in all four countries. The remaining impact of the traditional
conﬂicts of class and religion together with newly introduced electoral
systems (in Italy after the referendum of 1993) favoured a bipolar party
competition between ‘catch-all’ parties on each side of the left–right
divide:6 secular parties on the moderate left faced conservative-
confessional parties on the moderate right (see Polk and Rovny
5 There are comparative data for Spain in the 1980s which show the weakness of these
movements (Koopmans 1996: 38–40).
6 Although Greece, Portugal and Spain have proportional systems, the electoral formulas
and/or the size of the electoral districts render their outcomes somewhat majoritarian.
In Italy, the new electoral system that was introduced in 1994 favoured the formation of
bipolar electoral coalitions, although not necessarily the formation of a bipartisan system
(D’Alimonte and Bartolini 1997).
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unpublished). In Portugal, exceptionally, the mainstream right stabilised
with a division between a dominant liberal-conservative party (PSD) and
a minor conservative party (CDS-PP).
TheNew Right remained weak or inexistent. As previously mentioned,
the radical right was largely discredited by the authoritarian legacy.
In addition, it was weakened by the centre–periphery cleavage, by the
fact that immigration had hardly been an issue in these emigration coun-
tries until recently and by the generally positive attitude of southern
Europeans with respect to European integration (which was seen as
a modernising force and a safeguard against authoritarian tendencies
[see Díez Medrano 2003]). Neither in Portugal nor in Spain did the
New Right get a foot on the ground. In Portugal, the revolution was
dominated by forces of the extreme left and no party dared present itself
as a conservative force and thereby risk being linked to the old regime
(Gunter 2005: 271). In Spain, too, rejection of the past constituted
a handicap for the New Right as did the salience of the centre–periphery
cleavage, which implied that “nativism was to a certain extent already
credibly occupied by established parties” – centralist parties of the main-
stream right and peripheral-nationalist parties which dominated party
competition in the autonomous regions (Alonso and Rovira-Kaltwasser
2015: 8). In Italy and Greece, the New Right did succeed in establishing
itself but remained linked to the centre–periphery cleavage (in Italy: Lega
Nord) or proved to be a minor force (in Greece: LAOS). Euroscepticism,
to the extent that it existed at all, was mainly located on the old
Communist left (Verney 2011).
In CEE, the two transformations that had a profound impact on party
systems in NWE did not occur to the same extent either. As in SE, the
‘cultural revolution’ of the late sixties/early seventies hardly had an impact
at all, given the grip of the Communist regimes on the countries in
question, and the effect of ‘globalisation’ was much more closely linked
to the economic and political transition after the breakdown of the
Communist regimes. From our long-term perspective, as already men-
tioned, the newly emerging party systems in the CEE countries still
appear to be less institutionalised than the party systems in western
Europe (Casal Bértoa 2014; Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2015). The very
high level of volatility in these systems since the democratic transition is
the most important empirical evidence of their lack of institutionalisation
(see, e.g., Birch 2003; Powell and Tucker 2014; Sikk 2005). Haughton
and Deegan-Krause (2015) suggest that there are ‘new party subsystems’
in the CEE party systems, where with a succession of new parties one new
party is replaced by a still newer party as disillusioned voters migrate from
one new party to the next.
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The concept of cleavages structuring the party system hardly applies to
these party systems. It has been argued that the communist inheritance
left fragmented societies and an unstructured pattern of political conﬂict.
This ‘tabula rasa’ thesis (Offe 1991) was contrasted by a ‘post-communist
continuity’ thesis (Kitschelt 1992), which claimed that the socio-
economic legacies of the interwar and the socialist eras were to deﬁne
the conﬂict structure of the newly emerging democracies. Subsequent
empirical analyses showed that the CEE countries were indeed charac-
terised by conﬂicts of ethnicity (especially in the Baltic countries), religion
(especially in Poland), region, class, age and education (Evans 2006;
Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁeld 2012). However a multiplication of con-
ﬂicts does not yetmake for a clear-cut cleavage structure. Indeed, as Casal
Bertoa (2015) argues, cross-cutting conﬂicts may constrain party system
institutionalisation.
Early on, Kitschelt (1992) suggested several hypotheses on the
structuring of CEE party systems. First of all, he proposed a conﬂict
between modernisers, who were at the same time market liberalisers
and cosmopolitans, and traditionalists, who were expected to resist
both market liberalisation and the opening up of the national econ-
omy. In other words, contrary to the opposition between New Left
cosmopolitans and New Right nationalists that resulted from the two
transformations in NWE, he expected an opposition between right-
cosmopolitans and left-nationalists. In addition, and related to this
proposition, he expected the transition winners to embrace market
liberalisation, while the losers were expected to search for protection
from market liberalisation and market dependence. As a rival hypoth-
esis, he also mentioned the possibility that the losers might resort to
patterns of collective identity that lie outside of socio-economic rela-
tions, such as religion, nationality and ethnicity.
As it turned out, cultural issues have become more prominent in
structuring the CEE party systems than socio-economic considerations.
A major reason for this outcome is that, in addition to claims for social
justice, the post-communist left also embraced liberal economic reforms
and pro-Europeanism. As Tavits and Letki (2009) argue, the post-
communist left was even more likely than its right-wing opponents to
pursue rightist policies of ﬁscal responsibility and economic reform
because it needed to prove its dissociation from socialism and its ability
to operate in a democracy and a market economy, and because it also had
the opportunity to do so, given the loyalty of its electorate. In other words,
even if economic issues were among the most salient ones in CEE coun-
tries (see Rohrschneider and Whiteﬁeld 2009), they were not highly
politicised, given the convergence of the post-communist left and right
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on a policy of neoliberal reforms. However, the loyalty of the post-
communist left’s electorate already proved to be less than reliable in the
2000s. Given that there was nowhere to go on the left – there was no New
Left in the sense that we know it in NWE at all – the transition losers
searching for protection from market liberalisation and market depen-
dence turned to political illiberals on the right, who constantly spoke of
the economic issues confronting these losers but proposed non-economic
answers to their problems (see Ost 2005: 36).
Accordingly, a recent empirical study suggests that themain dimension
of conﬂict in CEE countries has indeed become strongly connected to
cultural issues (Coman 2015). However, given the absence of a cultural
revolution in the late 1960s/early 1970s in these countries, and given the
absence of immigration and the generally low salience of European inte-
gration after accession (Haughton 2014), these are not the cultural issues
that have come to structure the party systems in NWE. In line with
Kitschelt’s rival hypothesis, the common denominator of the cultural
issues mobilising the traditionalist side of the CEE electorates seems to
have become a ‘defensive nationalism’ asserting itself against internal
enemies (such as ethnic minorities: Russians, Roma and Jews) and exter-
nal ones (such as foreign corporations colonising the national economy,
or the European Union imposing undesired policy measures). This
defensive nationalism is embraced by the transition losers (e.g. ‘Poland
B’) and fuelled by the existence of contested national borders (e.g.
national diasporas in neighbouring countries), by the unassimilated
legacy of World War II and the Communist regimes, and by ‘more deep-
seated vulnerabilities’ (Haughton 2014: 80). Given the lack of institutio-
nalisation of the party systems, established party leaders in CEE countries
have a greater latitude to mobilise structural conﬂicts (see Sitter 2002),
and the strategies of the parties on the right proved to be decisive in the
way this defensive nationalism was mobilised (Enyedi 2005).
To summarise this discussion on the national party conﬁgurations in
the three regions before the Great Recession, Figure 1.2 presents
a stylised structuration of party competition before the economic crisis
for each of the three regions. This stylised presentation situates the parties
in a two-dimensional space which is deﬁned by the issues that structure
the party competition. For all three regions, we assume a two-
dimensional space with an economic and a cultural dimension, which
means that the issues that structure the party competition are assumed to
be linked to two underlying conﬂicts: an economic conﬂict that opposes
the left (which defends the welfare state) and the right (which defends
neoliberal positions), and a cultural dimension that opposes a culturally
open (integrationist or secular) position to a culturally closed
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Figure 1.2 Stylised structuration of party competition in the three
regions before the Great Recession
(demarcationist, religious or nationalist) position. Depending on the
region, the two dimensions are more or less associated with each other,
and the speciﬁc issues associated with the two dimensions vary according
to the region, as do the actor conﬁgurations that are embedded in the two-
dimensional space. The dashed lines in the stylised space indicate the
dominant structuring conﬂicts.
For NWE, the stylised conﬁguration opposes themainstream parties of
the moderate left and the moderate right on the economic dimension,
while the challengers from the New Left and the New Right are opposed
to each other on the cultural dimension. By the time the Great Recession
hit, this cultural dimension was mainly related to conﬂicts over cultural
liberalism, immigration and European integration. Note that the discre-
pancy between the pair of challengers along the cultural dimension is
expected to be muchmore pronounced than the discrepancy between the
pair of mainstream parties along the economic dimension. Note also that
on the other dimension the two pairs are expected to be somewhat
centrist. In addition, there may be a radical left (mainly small communist
and socialist parties) in these countries whose position is expected to be
close to the left-wing pole of the economic dimension.
For SE, this stylised conﬁguration opposes a culturally somewhat
liberal and economically somewhat interventionist moderate left against
a culturally somewhat traditionalist and economically somewhat neolib-
eral moderate right. The two dimensions are expected to be closely
associated with each other, and the actor conﬁguration is expected to be
mainly characterised by a bipolar opposition between the mainstream left
and right that amalgamates economic and cultural issues. As argued
before, the cultural dimension in SE should to some extent reﬂect the
ﬁrst transformation related to conﬂicts over cultural liberalism but should
hardly at all reﬂect the second transformation related to conﬂicts over
immigration and European integration. In addition, there are the remains
of the Communist party and its allies, which, just like the radical left in
NWE, are expected to be located close to the left-wing pole of the
economic dimension.
For CEE, this stylised conﬁguration opposes a moderate left and
a moderate right party along the cultural dimension – a dimension that
incorporates conﬂicts related to ethnic and nationalist issues. By contrast,
mainstream parties from both the left and the right are expected to have
economically converged to a somewhat pro-welfare position.
The moderate left defends the rights of ethnic minorities and/or
a secular position, while the moderate right is nationalist and possibly
also religious. Given this volatile situation, both the moderate left and the
moderate right might split and merge in different combinations but
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always rearrange themselves into two polar camps, and new populist
challengers from the right, but rarely from the left (given the discredited
Communist legacy), are always likely to come and go as suggested by the
concept of the ‘new party subsystem’.
1.4 Crises as Triggers for Party System Transformation
As emphasised in our theoretical model, we expect that the political
consequences of the economic crisis are the joint result of the ante-
cedent conditions, the characteristics of the crisis and of contingent
conditions during the crisis. As for the characteristics of the economic
crisis, the political consequences depend on its severity and timing.
As we shall see in Chapter 3, the severity of the crisis varied greatly
between NWE (with Iceland and Ireland as important exceptions), on
one hand, and SE and CEE, on the other hand. Thus, the simple fact
that the economic crisis was less severe and less protracted in NWE
already goes a long way towards explaining why its political impact was
less profound in NWE than in SE. In addition, the timing of the Great
Recession and experience of previous economic crises need to be taken
into account. In this respect, CEE differs from NWE and SE. In CEE,
the Great Recession came in the aftermath of a deep transition crisis,
which had arguably better prepared the eastern Europeans for the
shock experience of the economic downturn than the southern
Europeans, for whom (with the notable exception of the Portuguese)
the crisis came in the wake of an economic boom. Thus, as a result of
their intense experience with economic hardship in the past, CEE
voters had greater ‘pain tolerance’ in economic terms (Coffey 2013),
a tolerance that, however, may have come to an end the second time
around (Beissinger and Sasse 2014).
As is well known, in their ﬁrst reactions to the ﬁnancial crisis which
initiated the Great Recession, governments focused on the stability of
their national banking systems and on the consequences for the real
economy. They adopted bank rescue packages and countered the eco-
nomic impact of the crisis by adopting modest ﬁscal expansionary mea-
sures, relying on some version of ‘liberal’ or ‘emergency’ Keynesianism
(Armingeon 2012; Hall 2013; Pontusson and Raess 2012; Weber and
Schmitz 2011). As the ﬁnancial crisis turned into the euro crisis under the
impact of the Greek crisis that emerged in early 2010, governments
changed their policies and generally turned to austerity measures. From
then on, austerity policies including deep cuts in government expendi-
tures, tax increases and structural adjustment programmes (above all
labour market reforms and the deregulation of some selected sectors)
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became the only game in town. TINA – there is no other alternative –
became the catch phrase of economic policy.
It was with the turn to the euro crisis that the context of the European
Union’s multi-level governance structure assumed its full importance.
Given the close economic interdependence of the EUmember states, the
economic crisis in Europe developed into the euro crisis (Copelovitch
et al. 2016). This crisis was mainly driven by economic imbalances
between different members of the eurozone (see, e.g., Lane 2012;
Scharpf 2011). The governments of the weaker economies in SE and
CEE in particular were unable to cope with the crisis, and the EMU
governance structures revealed their structural weaknesses (see, e.g.,
Eichengreen 2012; Featherstone 2011). Importantly, the ensuing crisis
management involved above all the EU’s intergovernmental channel, and
the European governments represented their national interests as ‘debtor’
(southern European plus Ireland) or ‘creditor’ (north-western European)
nations in this bargaining process – whatever their partisan composition
(see, e.g., Grande and Kriesi 2016; Laffan 2016b).
The euro crisis gave rise to a crisis situation in some ‘debtor countries’
that much reminds us of the Latin American experience of the 1980s and
1990s. Under the pressure from the EU (represented by the ‘Troika’ and
legitimated by the decisions of the European Council), the national
governments adopted austerity policies that had harsh effects on large
parts of society. The model case is Greece, where the Troika intervened
the most heavily and with the most dramatic consequences for the coun-
try’s economy and its party system (see, e.g., Verney 2014). However,
under the impact of the crisis, other countries in our sample became the
object of supranational interventions too.7 As a result, the governments’
room for manoeuvre in macro-economic policy-making was severely
restricted, and they were not able to adopt the reforms they had initially
promised.
Importantly, an economic crisis may be linked to a political crisis.
It may increase dissatisfaction not just with the incumbents but also
with the established party system as a whole. It may exacerbate an already
lingering crisis of representation in the party system, and/or it may create
a crisis regarding the legitimacy of the party system as a whole.
7 Three of the four CEE countries (i.e. Hungary, Latvia and Romania) received ﬁnancial
assistance from the EU/IMF. In SE, all four countries became the object of supranational
interventions: Greece was the object of three bailout programmes, and Portugal experi-
enced one bailout programme in spring 2011, Spain accepted a bailout of its banks by the
ESM in summer 2012, and Italy, even if not formally bailed out, became the object of
‘implicit conditionality’ when it was hit by the ﬁnancial storm in summer 2011. In NWE,
Ireland was the only country bailed out by the EU/IMF in autumn 2010.
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The political crisis may result from poor government performance during
the economic crisis proper, but the economic crisis may also serve as
a catalyst rendering intolerable the generally poor governance at the
domestic level that had already prevailed before the crisis. This generally
poor performancemay have been the result of widespread corruption and
partiality, insufﬁcient rule of law or a general ineffectiveness of govern-
ment. It may aggravate the country’s economic difﬁculties, and these
difﬁculties, in turn, may reduce the citizens’ tolerance of poor govern-
ance. As Royo (2014) argues with regard to Spain, we cannot understand
the Spanish real estate bubble, the country’s loss of competitiveness or its
ﬁnancial crisis without taking into account what he calls the ‘extractive
behaviour’ of the Spanish political elite and the general ‘institutional
degeneration’ in Spanish politics. However, as he also argues, the pro-
blem in Spain has been both the extractive behaviour of the elite and the
fact that civil society tolerated this behaviour. It was only when the
economic crisis exposed the economic model as unsustainable that the
public became outraged with the actions of its elite. In Chapter 2 we shall
present some indicators of the extent to which the different regions and
the different countries within them experienced a political crisis.
Dissatisfaction with the existing system of party representation and
with the way democracy works in a given country is expressed through
calls for democratic renewal and reform on the party competition
agenda. When calls for democratic renewal become of overriding con-
cern in national elections, we expect them to give rise to
a reinterpretation of the cultural dimension of party competition.
Such a reinterpretation is typical of a party system transformation
phase and is likely to subside once the system has stabilised again.
We expect such calls for democratic renewal to be primarily articulated
by challenger parties. We suggest that political crises are generally likely
to give rise to anti-elitist mobilisation, which is the hallmark of populist
challengers – populism is considered here as an ideology that splits
society into two antagonistic camps, the virtuous people and some
corrupt establishment, effectively pitting one against the other and
claiming to restore sovereignty to the people (see Mudde 2004;
Canovan 1999). We should add, however, that a political crisis is not
necessarily exogenous to the development of populism. If economic
and political crises provide an opportunity for populist mobilisation,
they are in turn aggravated and brought to a climax by populists’
mobilisation strategies (Mofﬁt 2014: 2). We should also note that
populist challengers’ readiness to exploit economic and political crises
to their own electoral advantage is considerably attenuated when they
are themselves part of the government, when they provide external
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support to a (minority) government or when they are themselves
involved in some major scandal (see Kriesi and Pappas 2015b).
Finally, to add even more complexity to the sequence of crises, the
European governments and the EU institutions had to face yet another
major challenge towards the end of the period covered by our study: the
so-called refugee crisis. This challenge was caused by a massive inﬂow of
asylum seekers into Europe – especially from war-ridden Syria but also
from other countries around the world. According to Eurostat ﬁgures,
asylum applications in the EU gradually increased from below 200,000 in
2006 to around 335,000 in 2012. Thereafter, their numbers increased to
431,000 in 2013, 627,000 in 2014 and a record high of almost 1.3million
in 2015.8 As Börzel and Risse (2018) argue, the refugee crisis has revealed
the EU’s weaknesses in dealing with major crises evenmore than the euro
crisis did. More speciﬁcally, they argue that it has led to ‘non-compliance
with existing EU laws and decisions’ (Börzel and Risse 2018: 91) and to
a number of nationalist measures (such as a tightening of border controls)
in the absence of a working Europe-wide solution. The contestation
related to the refugee crisis points to yet another conﬂict line that divides
the EU member states – a ‘geographical’ divide unites the member states
from SE and parts of NWE (especially Germany) against most of CEE
and other parts of NWE.Most importantly for our argument, the political
contestation related to the refugee crisis taps into a growing resentment
towards cultural diversity and integration which, as we have argued
before, were at the core of the mobilisation of the New Right and the
restructuring of party politics in NWE long before 2015.
Whether or not the economic and/or the refugee crisis developed into
a political crisis, which then gave rise to far-reaching transformations in
party systems, depended on contingent conditions. Among these condi-
tions, it is important to consider incumbency (again, see Figure 1.1).
In the short run, economic crises may lead to the punishment of incum-
bents, as predicted by the economic voting literature. This literature is
based on the assumption that instrumentally rational voters will reward
the incumbents with their vote when the economy is good and punish
them when it is bad (Duch and Stevenson 2008; Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2007). Empirical studies of economic voting document that
it is both pervasive and variable, depending on the context. There is now
also a growing literature on economic voting in the Great Recession, and
this shows that the electoral punishment of the incumbents was massive
and that it was a function of the depth of the recession (Bartels 2014;
8 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics
(accessed 31 August 2016).
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Bellucci 2014; Hernández and Kriesi 2016; Indridason 2014; Magalhaes
2014a, 2014b; Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012, 2014; Teperoglou and
Tsatsanis 2014; Torcal 2014). This literature has also shown that the
punishment was particularly severe when the economic situation had
deteriorated dramatically (involving ECB/IMF intervention) (see, e.g.,
Marsh and Mikhaylov 2012; Hernández and Kriesi 2016).
However, the vicissitudes of incumbency can have more far-reaching
consequences than is typically assumed in the economic voting literature.
As we know from Roberts’ (2013) analysis of the consequences of the
implementation of structural adjustment programmes in the Latin
American economic crisis of the 1980s/1990s, the outcomes were shaped
by contingent alignments or conﬁgurations of actors during the economic
crisis.9 The structural adjustments either aligned or de-aligned the party
system programmatically, depending on which party was in government
and therefore had to implement the programme. Anti-neoliberal reactive
sequences were moderate where conservative-led market reforms aligned
party systems programmatically, stabilised party competition and chan-
nelled societal resistance toward institutionalised leftist parties (rather
than into extra-systemic forms of social and electoral protest).
By contrast, where traditional centre-left or populist parties implemen-
ted the structural adjustment policies, the critical juncture of the crisis de-
aligned party systems programmatically and eventually led to their
destruction. Reactive sequences produced electoral shifts to the left
across much of Latin America in the post-adjustment era, but they
spawned very different types of left turns in aligned and de-aligned
party systems. Against this background, it is very important to note that
in three out of four SE countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain), the
centre-left was in government when the crisis struck. Even in Italy, the
centre-left was indirectly involved in the implementation of adjustment
programmes, given that it supported the technocratic Monti government
that was responsible for the programme. In other words, in these coun-
tries the conditions were right for a ‘neoliberal convergence’ of the major
parties together with corresponding programmatic de-alignments.
Moreover, to a large extent the ‘neoliberal convergence’ of the major
parties was imposed by forces external to domestic party competition.
Therefore, we should take into account not only the two types of crisis
(economic and political) but also the fact that the economic crisis gave
rise to two overlapping types of conﬂict (with the domestic elite and the
European elite). The domestic conﬂict focused on austerity policies (an
9 For related arguments, see Mainwaring (2006), Morgan (2011), Seawright (2012) and
Lupu (2014).
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economic issue) on one hand and corruption and democratic renewal (a
political issue) on the other hand. The supranational conﬂict, where it
was present, obviously was about austerity too, but it also revolved
around the defence of the nation state, national pride and humiliation,
and it addressed the democratic deﬁcit at the European level.
Whoever is in government when an economic crisis hits is likely to
attempt to shift the public’s attention away from the crisis situation.
Avoidance strategies include displacing problems, shifting the debate to
secondary arenas, transforming substantive conﬂicts into moral ones,
personalising and negative publicity (‘negative campaigning’) (Kriesi
et al. 2009). But although incumbents may wish to avoid economic issues
in an economic crisis, they may not be able to do so, because in a situation
of deep crisis such issues become the top priority for the electorate and
because the opposition parties may seize the opportunity to campaign on
the poor economic performance of the governing parties.
The mainstream opposition is indeed likely to seize the golden opportu-
nity to blame the incumbents for the faltering economy and to gain in
proﬁle by promising a better future. However, the mainstream opposition
still basically has a choice between an accommodating and an adversarial
strategy.10 It may seem unlikely that it will choose to cooperate with the
incumbents’ austerity measures to counter the economic crisis, but this
cannot be excluded. Under pressure from the international community,
the mainstream opposition may be forced to act responsibly and support
the government’s policies. Alternatively, it may support such measures
because they are in line with its programmatic orientation, as may be the
case when centre-right opposition parties are confronted with austerity
measures taken by a centre-left government. Accommodating strategies
of mainstream opposition parties may be implemented in the form of
grand coalitions, technocratic governments, or simply by tacit or overt
support from the outside.
Nevertheless, opposition parties are more likely to adopt adversarial
strategies, especially if it is the centre-left that is in opposition.
In opposition, the left can beneﬁt from its issue ownership on social
issues, i.e. from its reputation and credibility in defending programmes
in favour of the economically disadvantaged. Provided they ﬁnd them-
selves in opposition, we expect Social Democrats and especially the more
radical left to distinguish themselves from the more pronounced austerity
positions of the moderate right. If they are in opposition, the economic
10 Meguid (2005) distinguishes between three strategies – dismissive, adversarial and
accommodating ones – which mainstream parties can adopt with respect to what she
calls ‘niche’ parties. The same applies, we would argue, to mainstream opposition parties
with respect to incumbents.
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crisis provides an opportunity for both Social Democrats and the radical
left to rejuvenate their traditional socio-economic proﬁles. If the left is in
opposition and, indeed, adopts an adversarial strategy, the party system
will increasingly polarise on economic issues. Whatever the strategy
adopted by the opposition parties, however, economic issues are likely
to gain high salience on the party-system agenda (Green-Pedersen and
Mortensen 2010) under the impact of the economic crisis.
The economic voting literature assumes that economically induced vot-
ing behaviour is cyclical without any long-term consequences.Moreover, it
essentially assumes that voters who are dissatisﬁed with the economic
performance of incumbents turn to mainstream opposition parties.
However, modern crises ‘are increasingly characterised by complexity,
interdependence and politicisation’ (Rosenthal et al. 2001), they generate
uncertainty, threats, and discontinuity and tend to act as focal points for
institutional, policy and political changes that leave signiﬁcant legacies
(Gourevitch 1986). Thus, while voters may habitually turn to mainstream
opposition parties in normal times, in an extraordinary crisis situation they
maymove beyondmainstream opposition parties and opt for parties not so
closely associated with the existing economic and political system.
In a crisis situation, the extraordinary punishment of mainstream parties
as a whole may (but need not, as we shall see in the case of Ireland) serve as
a catalyst for a long-term transformation of the party system.
Transformation of a party system by reactive sequences unleashed by
a political crisis takes time and is likely to occur in stepwise fashion.
Indeed, as Roberts (2017: 5) notes, considerable time may pass between
the demise of the old order and the consolidation of the new. The demise
of the old order may result in ﬂuid unstable party competition so that no
new equilibrium is reached. In Latin America, some of the most impor-
tant institutional changes in party systems did not play out during the
critical phase of structural adjustment but instead in its aftermath or the
post-adjustment period, when societal resistance to market liberalisation
strengthened and the region began to ‘turn left’ politically. We suggest
that it takes a series of ‘critical elections’ for a deep crisis to transform the
party system of a given country. At ﬁrst, the voters who punish the main-
stream incumbent are likely to turn to themainstream opposition. Only in
a second step, when the mainstream opposition also proves incapable of
improving the situation, are voters likely to opt for challenger parties
(Hernández and Kriesi 2016).11 This stepwise scenario may mainly
11 In his study of the protest vote in CEE, Pop-Eleches (2010) similarly distinguishes
between what he calls three generations of elections which are characterised by different
dynamics of party competition: the founding election; the second generation elections of
‘normal years’, when the protest vote punishes incumbents and turns to the opposition
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apply to SE and CEE, where the party systems are less institutionalised,
and may be less applicable to NWE, where the mainstream parties are
more resilient. In any case, the stepwise scenario implies that we shall
need to study a series of (post-)crisis elections to be able to assess the
impact of the economic crisis on party systems.
Moreover, to study the restructuring impact of such a crisis, it is
important to keep in mind that as voters turn to challenger parties they
are likely to take their preferences into account. As van der Brug et al.
(2000) argued some time ago, a vote for a challenger party is not just
a protest vote but also an expression of political preferences. Hernández
andKriesi (2016),Hernández (2016), andHobolt andTilley (2016) have
conﬁrmed this hunch more recently. They have shown that in the Great
Recession the European voters not only punished themainstream incum-
bents but mainstream parties in general: depending on their political
preferences and the European region, they turned to challengers from
either the left or the right.
1.5 Implications for the Transformation of PartyCompetition
in the Three Regions
From these general considerations, we deduce some ideal-typical scenar-
ios for the impact of the Great Recession on the structuration of national
party systems in the three regions – scenarios that will serve as a guide for
our analyses in the country-speciﬁc chapters. In a very loose sense, these
scenarios have the character of guiding hypotheses. They may not apply
to all the countries they intend to cover. Even in such cases where the
relevant scenario does not apply, it may, however, still serve a useful
purpose, because it may direct our attention to possible factors that
prevented the development expected by the scenario. Although the crisis
which we are focusing on here was a deep economic crisis, we maintain
that one of its crucial consequences for European national party systems
was a reinforcement of the non-economic dimensions of conﬂict – in
different ways, depending on the region. In NWE, we suggest that the
economic crises reinforced the integration–demarcation conﬂict, while in
SE it gave rise to the emergence of a conﬂict between ‘old’ and ‘new’
politics, and in CEE it reinforced the conﬂict between defensive nation-
alism and cultural and economic openness. In addition, given the depth of
the economic crisis, we do not exclude the possibility of a resurgence of
camp; and the third-generation elections when both mainstream camps have well-
established but not altogether positive records and the protest vote turns to previously
marginal unorthodox parties and new parties.
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the politicisation of economic conﬂicts, especially in the hard-hit coun-
tries of SE.
We begin with NWE, for which we propose a scenario of continuity.
As we have argued, in NWE the challengers in the party system originally
came from the New Left but more recently mainly from the New Right.
For this region, we shall distinguish between two types of countries:
countries where the New Right has been on the rise since the early
1980s; and countries where the New Right was not yet established before
the Great Recession. In the former countries, where the New Right was
already well entrenchedwhen the ﬁnancial crisis hit, the economic crisis is
most likely to have only had a limited impact on the party systems.
In these countries the economic crisis was not very severe in the ﬁrst
place, which constrained its structuring capacity. As a result of the euro
crisis, where these countries were on the side of the creditor countries,
both economic and cultural conﬂicts are likely to have been reinforced to
some extent, given the reluctance of their electorates to support the
debtor countries, a reluctance which was justiﬁed both on economic
and on moral grounds. Similarly, the refugee crisis that intervened at
the end of the period covered by our study is likely to have reinforced
both economic and cultural conﬂicts in these countries. However, the
main reason for the limited structuring capacity of these crises lies in the
fact that the party systems of these countries had already been trans-
formed as a result of the long-term rise of the New Left and the New
Right before the crises intervened. In other words, the
integration–demarcation conﬂict had already been institutionalised in
their party systems. In Austria, France, the Netherlands and
Switzerland, the economic and the refugee crises may at best have served
to reinforce long-term trends.
However, in these countries the economic crisis may have triggered
modiﬁcations in the position of the New Right along the economic
dimension: while the rise of the New Right in these countries was mainly
due to its positions along the cultural dimension, we should not forget
that, according to Kitschelt’s (1995) ‘winning formula’, it originally
combined cultural nationalism with economic liberalism. Already before
the crisis, the New Right had started to shift its economic position to the
left (seeMichel unpublished) as a result of the declining importance of the
anti-state, anti-tax petite bourgeoisie among its electorate.12 Given that
its constituency of ‘globalisation losers’ was particularly hard hit by the
Great Recession, we expect the New Right to have increasingly
12 Switzerland is a notable exception in this respect (see Afonso and Rennwald
forthcoming).
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abandoned Kitschelt’s (1995) winning formula during the crisis and to
have adopted a more social-democratic position along the economic
dimension. As a result, the alignment between the economic and the
cultural dimensions should have become even weaker during the crisis
period than it already was in these countries.
For the countries in NWE where for different reasons no party of the
populist right had already established itself before the onset of the Great
Recession, the multiple crises that Europe subsequently faced may have
served as a catalyst to allow them to belatedly catch up with the general
trend. With the exception of Ireland (and the United Kingdom, which
was not part of the eurozone), these countries found themselves among
the creditor countries in the euro crisis too. In other words, the reluctance
of their electorates to support the debtor countries provided a strong
incentive for the mobilisation of the nationalist Eurosceptics of the New
Right, who defended their national taxpayers against solidarity with
undeserving debtors. Moreover, the internal migration within the EU
and the refugee crisis served as additional incentives for the mobilisation
of theNewRight. Accordingly, we would expect an increasing restructur-
ing capacity of new cultural issues – European integration and immigra-
tion above all – and a breakthrough of new challenger parties that
mobilised on these issues. Arguably, this second scenario of continuity
applies to Germany and the UK – two cases which are included in our
study – and also to countries such as Sweden (Jungar 2015) and Finland
(Ylä-Anttila and Ylä-Anttila 2015), which are not part of it. Ireland is the
exception that conﬁrms the rule: as a debtor country, Ireland experienced
the crisis above all in economic terms (similar to the SE countries in this
respect), which provided an unlikely basis for mobilisation by the populist
radical right.
In stark contrast to NWE, as we shall show in detail in Chapter 3, in SE
the Great Recession not only struck hard but also unleashed a political
crisis of major proportions. In line with these contextual conditions, the
appropriate scenario for SE is one of a profound transformation of the
party systems, a transformation we suggest followed the stepwise proce-
dure described in Section 1.4. As is well known, this transformation was
driven by challengers from the New Left. As already mentioned, the New
Left beneﬁted from the fact that, in all four countries, the mainstream left
was in government (or supporting a technocratic government) at the time
when the crisis developed its greatest political momentum. Accordingly,
it was the mainstream left which had to implement the austerity measures
imposed on SE governments, with the devastating consequences on its
electoral fortunes that we know fromLatin America. It was up to the New
Left to articulate the left’s traditional anti-austerity position in the face of
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extreme economic hardship. In addition, the New Left could most cred-
ibly make claims for democratic renewal, which became a key issue in SE
as a result of the erosion of themainstream parties under the impact of the
economic crisis. As a consequence of theNew Left’s double opposition to
themainstream parties on economic and political grounds, economic and
political conﬂicts are expected to have become closely aligned in the SE
political space. As long as the mainstream left was in government, it was
the target of the New Left’s call for democratic renewal, but once it re-
joined the opposition it is likely to have shifted to the democratic renewal
camp too, which, in turn, facilitated the alignment of the two types of
conﬂicts.
As will be shown in Chapter 3, with the exception of Poland, the CEE
countries were hit hard by the economic crisis too, but – contrary to the
southern European countries – they recovered rather rapidly. What dis-
tinguishes these countries is that their party systems were already in crisis
before the Great Recession struck. This applies both to countries with an
already robust party competition (Hungary and Poland in our study) and
to countries without such a robust competition (Latvia and Romania in
our study).13 In the latter group, politics was far more corrupt and the
consolidation of a structured competition appeared to be less likely than
in the former group before the onset of the economic crisis. In all four
countries we are considering here, a political crisis had preceded the onset
of the economic crisis. Given their poor political governance records,
these countries had seen political mobilisations against corrupt elites
and for political renewal before the economic crisis struck. These political
crises were expressions of the as-yet-incomplete consolidation of their
party systems. As a result of the fact that the political crisis preceded the
economic crisis, our framework needs to be amended for CEE countries.
The scenario we propose for the CEE countries is one of consolidation
of still fairly volatile party systems. In the case of these countries, the
impact of the economic crisis was linked to the pre-existing political crisis.
We suggest that in the wake of the preceding political crises the overriding
contentious issues in CEE party systems during the Great Recession were
of a more narrowly political nature and that the economic crisis, although
(with the exception of Poland) very severe, only had a rather limited
impact on the restructuring of their party systems. The economic crisis
may even have contributed to further consolidation of these party systems
by bringing the lingering political crisis to a head. The exception to this
scenario is again Poland, where the political crisis had already been
resolved (at least for the time being) before the economic crisis struck.
13 For this distinction, see Grzymala-Busse (2007: 10–15) and Innes (2014).
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In the absence of a New Left, the likely drivers of the expected consolida-
tion were the mainstream parties, although they were still challenged by
new parties on the radical right. As a result of this scenario, we expect the
key dimension to be the cultural dimension, which includes the key issues
related to democratic renewal and to ‘defensive nationalism’.
As this summary of the expected ideal-typical scenarios suggests, we
assume that the Great Recession had one common counter-intuitive
effect on the party systems in all three regions: we expect that it reinforced
the cultural-cum-political dimension across Europe. In NWE, this is
a consequence of the reinforced mobilisation of the New Right, while in
SE and CEE it results from the political crises that it initiated or brought
to a head.
1.6 Outline of the Book
The book is structured in three main parts. In addition to the present
chapter, the ﬁrst part includes an overview of the design of the study and
an empirical assessment of the extent to which the ﬁfteen countries faced
an economic and political crisis situation (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 presents
the type of media-based data we use to study conﬂicts in the electoral
arena and it cross-validates our approach with the well-known compara-
tive manifesto data. The second part (eleven chapters in total) presents
detailed studies of how the national party systems have been restructured
since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. This part is split into three
sub-parts, each focusing on one of the three macro regions in Europe.
Chapters 4 to 7 deal with the developments in the four southern
European countries; Chapters 8 to 11 with those in central and eastern
Europe; and ﬁnally Chapters 12 to 14 take stock of the developments in
north-western European party competition. Each country chapter is
structured in the same way: ﬁrst, the authors discuss the key traditional
and new divides structuring party competition and the institutional set-
ting (especially the electoral system) and actor conﬁguration. Next, they
turn to the crisis dynamics and present the main developments that left
theirmark on party competition in the country in question. In a third step,
an empirical analysis based on media data is introduced and discussed.
Given that six countries in NWE have already been represented in earlier
studies by Kriesi et al. (2008, 2012), we have decided to devote only two
chapters to those cases: Chapter 12 examines the impact of the crises in
the countries that already had a strong New Right party prior to 2008 –
Austria, France, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Chapter 13, by con-
trast, compares Britain and Germany, as the two countries which only
saw electoral inroads by these parties in the crisis period. Chapter 14
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concludes this part with the case of Ireland. The third part of the books
consists of two comparative chapters. Chapter 15 presents a comparative
assessment of the commonalities and dissimilarities across the three
regions. This quantitative study on the big picture of the partisan offer
(measured with our original media data) is complemented by the ﬁnal
chapter, which considers additional features of party systems and takes
a more qualitative and country-focused approach to summarise the
dynamics and outcomes of the crises. In combination, the two chapters
provide an answer to our initial research questions of whether and how
the multiple crises that Europe faced in the aftermath of the Great
Recession inﬂuenced the intensity and structuration of political conﬂict
in national party systems.
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